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II.

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Utah Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction of an

appeal from an order of the Board of Oil, Gas and Miningtpursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(iv)(Supp. 1990).
III.

DEFINITION OF TERMS
This brief will make repeated reference to the

following pleadings, transcripts, names, statutes, parties,
wells, orders, and certain oil and gas terms:
"Act" or "Forced Pooling Statute" is the Oil and Gas
Conservation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6 (1988) (Addendum D ) ,
which mandates forced pooling and nonconsent penalties, and which
allows more than one well to be producing in a drilling unit;
"Altamont/Bluebell Field" is an oil and gas field in
Duchesne and Uintah Counties, Utah, which has been spaced for 640
acre drilling units for the Lower Green River/Wasatch Formations;
"ANR" is ANR Production Company, the Petitioner below
and the Appellee or Respondent on appeal;
"Bennion" is Sam H. Bennion, the Respondent below and
the Appellant or Petitioner on appeal;
The "Board" is the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, of the
Utah Division of Oil, Gas and Mining;
"consenting parties" means those companies or parties
who elect to invest money in the drilling of an oil and gas well
and who have the right to drill such an oil and gas well pursuant

to their ownership of an oil and gas lease or unleased mineral
interest.
"Drilling Unit11 is the drilling (spacing) unit
established for Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5 West, Uintah
Special Meridian, Duchesne County, Utah, an irregular section
containing 678.2 acres;
"Index" followed by a page number shall refer to the
Index of Record as filed with this Court;
"Miles Well" is the Miles 2-1B5 Well located in the
Drilling Unit and is the increased density well (the second well)
drilled on the Drilling Unit;
"nonconsenting parties" are those companies or
individuals who do not elect to invest money in the drilling of
an oil and gas well even though they have the right to drill such
an oil and gas well pursuant to their ownership of an oil and gas
lease or unleased mineral interest.
"nonconsent penalty" means the percentage of the
nonconsenting parties1 share of costs that the consenting parties
may recover out of the nonconsenting parties' share of oil and
gas produced from a well.

A 100% nonconsent penalty means that

the consenting parties may recover from production only the
nonconsenting parties' share of costs. A 175% nonconsent penalty
means that the consenting parties may recover from production the
nonconsenting parties1 share of the costs plus an additional 75%
of those costs.
-2-

"Order" is the order of the Board in Docket No. 90-021,
Cause 139-63 (Addendum A), dated September 20, 1990, which is the
subject of this appeal;
"1981 Order" is the order of the Board in Cause 139-13
(Addendum B), dated April 30, 1981, which force pooled the
Drilling Unit;
"1985 Order" is the order of the Board in Docket No.
85-007, Cause No. 139-42 (Addendum C), dated April 17, 1985,
which allowed for two producing wells in each drilling unit in
the Altamont/Bluebell Field;
"Tew Well" is the Tew 1-1B5 Well located in the
Drilling Unit and is the first well drilled on the Drilling Unit;
"TR" followed by a page reference shall refer to the
transcript of the hearing held before the Board on May 24, 1990;
"1985 TR" is the transcript of the hearing before the
Board on the issue of increased density (reflected in the 1985
Order);
IV.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

A.

Is Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6 (1988), constitutional

in that it authorizes the Board to issue orders allowing
consenting owners to recoup from production of oil and gas
attributable to nonconsenting owners 150% to 200% of drilling and
completion costs?
While this issue may be one of first impression by this
Court, similar statutes have been upheld in other jurisdictions
-3-

as a legitimate exercise of the police powers of the state to
bring to pass the objectives of the various states to (i) prevent
waste, and (ii) to protect the correlative rights of all of the
mineral interest owners within a designated drilling unit.

See

for example the Syllabus by the Court in Anderson v. Corporation
Commission, 327 P.2d 699 (Okla. 1958), where the Oklahoma Supreme
Court said:
A statute authorizing the Corporation
Commission to regulate production of oil and
gas so as to prevent waste and to secure
equitable apportionment among owners of the
leasehold interest of the oil and gas
underlying their land, and to fairly
distribute among them, the costs of
production and of the apportionment is a
proper exercise of the police power and does
not violate the provisions of the State or
Federal Constitutions. Id. at 700.
B.

Was Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6 (1988), properly

applied by the Board in its order allowing ANR, the operator of
the Miles Well and the other nonconsenting parties, to recoup
175% of Bennion's share of the drilling and completion costs?
The Order is fair and reasonable as applied to Bennion.
Other parties in the drilling unit who were signatories to the
Joint Operating Agreement ("JOA"), had contractually obligated
themselves to be subject to a 300% nonconsent penalty in the
event they chose not to participate in the Miles Well. In
addition, the nonconsenting parties under the JOA did not receive
a royalty until payout was achieved.

Bennion, on the other hand,

receives a royalty equal to average royalty being paid to other
-4-

land owners in the Drilling Unit who have leased their mineral
interest (at least l/8th of production), and, upon payout from
production of 1.75 times of his share of the drilling and
completion costs, he will participate at 8/8ths of his interest
in the Drilling Unit, subject only to paying his proportionate
share of the ongoing costs of production.

The 175% nonconsent

penalty is not only fair, it is much more favorable to Bennion
than to anyone else holding interests in the section.
C.

Does the Board have the authority to amend its

orders from time to time as circumstances change?
Utah Code Ann. § 40-^6-6 (1988), provides in part:
(2) The Board may modify the order to
provide an exception to the authorized
location of a well when the Board finds such
a modification to be reasonably necessary.
(3) An order establishing drilling
units for a pool shall cover all lands
determined by the Board to be underlain by
the pool, and the order may be modified
by
the Board to include additional areas
determined to be underlain by the pool.
(4) . . . The Board may modify
the
order to decrease or increase the size of
drilling units or permit additional wells to
be drilled within the established units.
(Emphasis added.)
Between the time of the 1981 Order and the hearing in
this matter on May 24, 1990, the Act was amended in 1983 and the
Board had issued an order affecting this and other lands in the
Altamont/Bluebell Field allowing for two producing wells in each
-5-

drilling unit (1985 Order).

Clearly, the Board had the authority

to amend the 1981 Order.
D.

Did ANR have an obligation to petition the Board

for the right to drill the Miles Well?
The 1985 Order provides:
C.

the option

Additional wells may be drilled at

of the operator

of the unit,

based

upon geologic and engineering data for that
unit which will justify the drilling of an
additional well in order to recover
additional oil, provided the additional well
appears to be economically feasible.
(Emphasis added.)
The Transcript of the hearing for the 1985 Order makes
it clear that Board does not want to be in the business of
reviewing drilling applications on the basis of economic factors
every time a second well is drilled within an existing unit.
CHAIRMAN WILLIAMS: We tried to incorporate what we
think is the existing condition now, which is a prudent
operator standard. (1985 TR, page 258).
This is not to suggest that applications for permits to
drill are no longer filed for administrative approval to the Utah
Department of Natural Resources.

The Board, however, felt that

all else being equal, an application for a permit to drill a
second well should not be treated any differently than the
application for the first well, and would not require Board
approval.
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E.

Should the Court accept the findings of fact of

the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining as being supported by
"substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the Court"?
The standard of appellate review is set forth in the
Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to 22
(1989).

Section 63-46b-16(4) states:
(4) The appellate court shall grant
relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking
judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:

(g) the agency action is
based upon a determination of fact,
made or implied by the agency, that
is not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of
the whole record before the court;
F.

Should the Court should give deference to the

conclusions of the Board based on the Board's findings of facts,
that Bennion be subject to a 175% nonconsent penalty in the
Drilling Unit?
The Administrative Procedures Act has been reviewed by
the Court most recently in the case of First National Bank of
Boston v. County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 799
P.2d 1163 (1990), where "substantial evidence" under Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) was defined as ". . . that quantum and
quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a
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reasonable mind to support a conclusion."

799 P.2d 1163, 1165.

See also Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah
App. 1989).
V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6 (1988), authorizes the Board to
impose a nonconsent penalty of (i) 100% of the costs of the
surface equipment beyond the wellhead, (ii) 100% of the operating
costs since the date of first production, and (iii) 150% to 200%
of the drilling and completion costs to be recouped from
production of those parties who do not participate financially in
the drilling of an oil well.

This case is simply to determine if

a mineral interest owner, who doesn't lease his land and who
otherwise has not consented to the proposed well, is subject to
the nonconsent penalty.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

ANR

filed a Request For Agency Action with the Board on April 10,
1990, seeking an order specifying the percentage of costs to be
recovered by all consenting owners of the Miles Well before
Bennion, as a nonconsenting owner, is entitled to receive his
share of production.

The Board, after considering all of the

evidence offered at a hearing in the matter on May 24, 1990, and
after reviewing briefs submitted the parties, ordered, on August
23, 1990, that prior to Bennion being able to receive proceeds
from the Miles Well other than a royalty, the consenting owners
-8-

must recover from his share of the production, (i) 100% of the
costs of the surface equipment beyond the wellhead, (ii) 100% of
the operating costs since the date of first production, and (iii)
175% the drilling and completion costs of the Miles Well
(hereinafter called a "175% nonconsent penalty).

The Order was

later reduced to writing on September 20, 1990. On October 12,
1990, Bennion filed a Petition for Review of Administrative
Action with this Court.
VI.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6 (1988), is constitutional

because it is a legitimate exercise of the State of Utah's police
power to "foster, encourage, and promote the development,
production and utilization" of Utah's oil and gas resources. By
imposing nonconsent penalties within the Drilling Unit, the
Board, under the Act, is preventing wasteland protecting the
correlative rights of all of the mineral interest owners.
B.

The Act has been constitutionally applied in this

case by the Board since the consenting parties are recouping a
fair and reasonable amount from Bennionfs share of the production
which is less than from any other lessor or working interest
owner in the Drilling Unit.

He has not been singled out by the

Board or the operator, ANR, for special treatment.
C.
Order.

It was appropriate for the Board to amend the 1981

The Board has the authority under the Act to amend its

orders as circumstances change.

The changes of the Act in 1983,
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the Order of the Board in 1985, and the proposal to drill the
Miles Well in 1990 have made the 1981 Order obsolete in defining
the relationship among the interest owners in the Drilling Unit.
Also, Bennion, through his actions, has waived his claim that the
1981 Order cannot be amended.
D.

There is nothing in the 1985 Order which would have

required or even allowed ANR to petition the Board for the right
to drill the Miles Well.

The 1985 Order made it clear that the

decision to drill a second well was up to the operator.
E.

The Court should not disturb the findings of the

Board since the findings were,adequately supported by the record.
Appellant has not made reference to any portion of the record
below to support Bennion*s contention that the Board had an
inadequate basis for its findings.

The legal conclusion of the

Board that Bennion should be subject to the 175% nonconsent
penalty is based on findings of the Board which were sufficient
as a matter of law to make its legal conclusions.

The Board

consists of highly qualified members who have experience in oil
and gas matters.

The Court should give weight to the expertise

of the Board in reviewing its findings.
VII.

ARGUMENT
A.

THE FORCED POOLING STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

The Supreme Court of the United States in Hunter Co. v.
McHuqh, 320 U.S. 222, 64 S.Ct. 19, held that:

-10-

. . . a state has constitutional power
to regulate production of oil and gas so as
to prevent waste and to secure equitable
apportionment among landowners of the
migratory gas and oil underlying their land,
fairly distributing among them the costs of
production and of the apportionment.
Id. at 21.
While this issue may be one of first impression by this
Court, similar statutes have been upheld in other jurisdictions
as a legitimate exercise of the police powers of the state to
bring to pass the objectives of the various states to (i) prevent
waste, and (ii) to protect the correlative rights of all of the
mineral interest owners within a designated drilling unit.

"The

constitutionality of compulsory pooling statutes has been
sustained so generally that no reasonable question on this score
remains."

H. WILLIAMS AND C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §905.1

(1990 Edition).
The case of Anderson v. Corporation Commission, 327 P.2d 699
(Okla. 1958), is a good example of legal authority upholding
statutes which regulate the creation and participation in
drilling units for oil and gas.

In Anderson, the court was asked

to pass on the constitutionality of an Oklahoma statute which
required a mineral interest owner to accept a bonus payment (set
by the commission) if he chose not participate in the drilling of
the unit well.

Upon receipt of the bonus, the mineral interest

owner forfeits any further working interest or right to
participate in the unit.

In reaching its holding that the
-11-

statute was a constitutional exercise of police power, the court
reviewed the public policy and the balancing of interests which
it felt supported the state action.
To curtail over-production and waste for
the benefit and protection of the general
public, restraints had to be placed around
the individualf s rights to develop and
produce beyond the demand or need. The only
logical method of restraint, other than
limitation of production per well, was the
curtailment of drilling by exercise of the
police power. There evolved the well spacing
laws. But, with well spacing alone, the
object of curtailment was met, although often
at the expense of serious inequalities and
inequities between the various mineral owners
and lessees. . . . Thus consideration of the
correlative rights of such owners and lessees
became a necessary part of the legislation.
The results were the acts authorizing
unitization and pooling in each common source
of supply in order that the exercise of the
police power in the conservation of natural
resources would not effect too serious an
unbalancing of correlative rights.
Id. at 701.
The issue in the Anderson case is not any different than the
constitutional issue raised by Bennion.

Both ANR and Bennion had

to give up something in order to get something.

ANR has to pay

Bennionfs share of costs and to share proceeds from the Miles
Well in return for being allowed to drill an additional well on
the Drilling Unit.

Bennion has to be subject to a modest

nonconsent penalty in return for receiving a royalty and standing
on the sideline and watching the well go down at no cost or risk
to him.

As the court in Anderson observed:
-12-

All property is held subject to the
valid exercise of the police power; nor are
regulations unconstitutional merely because
they operate as a restraint upon private
rights of person or property or will result
in loss to individuals. The infliction of
such loss is not a deprivation of property
without due process of law; the exertion of
police power upon subjects lying within its
scope, in a proper and lawful manner, is due
process of law.
Id. at 702 (quoting from Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 73 S.W.2d
475, 478).
The Forced Pooling Statute in Utah is much more
favorable to the nonconsenting landowner than the Oklahoma
statute.

Bennion does not lose his right to his working interest

in the Drilling Unit for all time.

If the Oklahoma statute has

withstood constitutional attack, the Utah Act should also be
found to pass constitutional muster.
In addition to Oklahoma, other state courts have found
that a state has constitutional power to regulate production of
oil and gas so as to prevent waste and to secure equitable
apportionment among mineral property owners.

See Hunter v.

Justice's Court of Centinela Tp.. 223 P.2d 465 (Calif. 1950), and
Svlvania Corporation v. Kilborne, 271 N.E.2d 524 (N.Y. 1971).
The purpose of a nonconsent penalty is to balance the
risks and benefits of drilling an oil and gas well between the
parties agreeing to invest substantial sums of money in drilling
an oil and gas well and the parties that refuse to invest any
money.

The parties that agree to pay for the cost of drilling a
-13-

well face real risks that they may not make any money on their
investment.

In fact, they may not recover part or all of their

investment.

A well may be a dry hole, the cost of drilling may

exceed all expectations, production may be insufficient to pay
the cost of the well or prices may drop.
The parties that do not agree to invest their money do
not face these risks.

If the well is dry, the nonconsenting

parties do not pay a penny.

If the well is productive they will

claim a substantial benefit by having a producing well on their
property.
There is a large incentive for a party to become a
nonconsenting party if there is no nonconsent penalty.

There is

also a large incentive for a party to refuse to agree to pay
another partyfs share of the cost of drilling a well if there is
no nonconsent penalty.

By drilling a well the consenting parties

are bestowing a potentially valuable asset on the nonconsenting
party at a risk to themselves but at no risk to the nonconsenting
party.

Without a nonconsent penalty a nonconsenting party would

receive all of the benefits of the drilling of the well and face
none of the risks.

The nonconsent penalty is one method of

balancing the risks and benefits of drilling the well.
The Utah Legislature has examined the issue of
consenting and nonconsenting parties and enacted a statute, the
Forced Pooling Statute, that balances the risks and benefits of
drilling a well between the consenting and nonconsenting parties.
-14-

Under the Forced Pooling Statute the consenting parties are
obligated to pay all of the cost of drilling the well including
the costs attributable to the nonconsenting parties1 interests.
The nonconsenting parties are not liable for any portion of the
cost of drilling a well.

If the well is successful, and only if

the well is successful, then the consenting parties may begin to
recoup the costs attributable to the nonconsenting parties'
interests from the production attributable to such interests.
The consenting parties are required to pay the nonconsenting
parties a royalty equal to the average royalty in the unit until
the nonconsent penalty is paid out.

To remove the disincentive

to drilling that the consenting parties face by having to pay the
nonconsenting parties1 share of the costs, the Utah Legislature
has mandated that the consenting parties be allowed to recover
from production (i) 100% of the costs of the surface equipment
beyond the wellhead, (ii) 100% of the operating costs since the
date of first production, and (iii) 150% to 200% of the drilling
and completion costs.

To compensate them, the nonconsenting

parties receive a royalty, plus they are entitled to have the
benefit of a well once the nonconsent penalty is recovered from
production.
This recovery allowed by the Forced Pooling Statute is
commonly referred to as a nonconsent penalty.

It should be noted

that a 100% nonconsent penalty would only allow the consenting
parties to recover out of production 100% of the costs
-15-

attributable to the nonconsenting parties.

A 175% nonconsent

penalty allows the consenting parties to recover out of
production such costs, plus 75% of such costs as compensation for
agreeing to pay for the costs of the well.

The practice in

industry usually calls for nonconsent penalties ranging from 200
to 300 percent for development wells, at least 300 percent for
most exploratory (wildcat) wells, and in very expensive areas,
particularly offshore operations, as much as 1,000 percent.
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS, WILLIAMS AND MEYERS (6th Edition,
1984).
It should also be noted that the nonconsenting parties
do not "pay" for the cost of the well in any traditional sense of
the word.

The nonconsenting parties are not required to pay any

cash or write a check.

If the well is not productive then the

nonconsenting parties are not liable for any of the drilling
costs.

If the well is productive then the consenting parties are

entitled to receive the production attributable to the
nonconsenting partiesf interests until they recoup the
nonconsenting parties' share of such costs.

The nonconsenting

parties do receive a royalty.
Bennion's claims that he must "pay" a 175% penalty are
somewhat misleading.

Bennionfs claim that he would have to pay

175% of his costs and receive nothing if the well is not
productive enough, (Bennion Brief at 14), is incorrect for two
reasons.

First, Bennion?s nonconsent penalty is recovered only
-16-

out of production.

If the well is not productive enough to allow

the consenting owners to recover the full 175% penalty, then
Bennion will not have to "pay" any portion of the remainder of
the 175% penalty.
any production.

Second, Bennion is paid a royalty if there is
In addition, Bennionfs claim that his nonconsent

penalty is higher than anyone else's (Bennion Brief at 13) is
also incorrect.

Mr. Dave Laramie testified that in excess of

three companies elected not to participate in the Miles Well and
those companies would be subject to a 300% nonconsent penalty.
(TR, page 22).
On balance, the Forced Pooling Statute is a legitimate
exercise of the State's police power to regulate the production
of oil and gas in Utah.

The correlative rights of Bennion and

ANR and the other consenting parties are being protected, and the
State's interests in the conservation and prevention of waste are
being served.
B. THE NONCONSENT PENALTY ALLOWED UNDER THE ACT IS
CONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED IN THIS CASE.
It is difficult to understand Bennion's claim that his
circumstances are so unique that the nonconsent penalty is
unconstitutional as applied to him.

If a nonconsent penalty is

constitutional on its face then Bennion must show that the
statute has been applied in an unconstitutional manner.
Bennion appears to assert that since he had a vested
property right then it is unconstitutional to impose a nonconsent
«17-

penalty.

Every mineral leasehold owner and unleased mineral

interest owner in a unit, however, has a vested property right.
If the nonconsent penalty is constitutional then every time it is
imposed it will affect the rights of parties with vested property
rights.

The mere fact that Bennion has a vested property right

does not mean that he cannot be made subject to a nonconsent
penalty.

Bennion has not made any showing or claimed that his

vested property rights are different from any other unleased
mineral interest owner's property rights.

If a nonconsent

penalty can be constitutionally imposed, then it can be
constitutionally imposed upon Bennion in this case.
Bennionfs claim that the 175% nonconsent penalty is
unconstitutional because it is unreasonable is really a claim
that there was no risk in drilling the Miles Well.

In making

this assertion, Bennion mischaracterized a case and omitted any
reference to evidence that supports the Board's decision.
The amount of the risk involved in drilling the Miles
Well is a question of fact.

The Board made a finding of fact as

to the amount of risk that was involved in drilling the Miles
Well.

The Board found "there is sufficient evidence of risk

incurred by the consenting owner that a penalty of 175% is
appropriate" (Order at 10). As stated in Section E of the
Arguments of this brief, if there is substantial evidence to
support this finding of fact, then a reviewing court may not find
to the contrary.

This finding of fact that there was enough risk
-18-

to impose a 1 7 5 % n o n c o n s e n t p e n a l t y is s u p p o r t e d b y s u b s t a n t i a l
e v i d e n c e in the record.
evi d e n c e

in tin i ece

B e n n i o n h a s failed --. ;^):.t. *o a m
- *

-

is u n r e a s o n a b l e e x c e p t that i ^ M S . K

Davi d I1" 1

I »ai i

involved ii 1 d r i l l i n c

, ena ! t y

- iiiiiing ,-i irv h. ie is

* •:* u n e c o n o m i c well OT **- D r i l l i n g

low and that t h e r e :
Ur li t.

-

- . . - . : ,<.- M i l e s W e l l .

•*•••• included t .

* ne i isk

of p r i c e f l u c t u a t i o n s (TR, p a g e IV;, ( 2 ) t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a
b l o w o u t (TR

p a g e 3 0 ) ; (3) mecham'nal p r o b l e m s m a y d e v e l o p , such

as c a s i n g f a i l u r e (TR p a g e 3 0 )

t h r e e o t h e r c o m p a n i e s had

e l e c t e d n o t t o p a r t i c i p a t e in ' tne clriiiii:

o f tl :ie 1^ li ] es We] ] ( TR

page 22); (5) the risk that, the Mi les Well could turn out to be
uneconomic (TR, page 2r)

>-

(6) drill! ng a well t o 1 4,000 feet

T h e r e is r 10 e v i d e n c e i n t h e record t o c o n t r a d i c t this
testimony.

B e n n i o n p u t oii ilo e v i d e n c e to r e f u t e c

this t e s t i m o n

•

~

contradict

,. r

brief a r g u i n g that t h e risk ui drilling ?\ dry hole is v e \ s;
The risk <
COI if rOI ltS

-,*.-; :.t:

^

t c ! P I - o^ I y

;: :J I c

not p r o d u c t i v e ot i

f

J

*
r

and/or gas

-

* : ski * ) - *

(--«,

w h i c ^ :s ioi p r o d u c t i v e

-f

oil a n d / o r c:a^ in p a y i n g q u a n t i t i e s ) "" MANUAL O F Oil AND GAS
TERMS,,

IA ....... r.-.

„ MEYERS, Sixt .h Edition (1984) at 255

Even if the r isk of dri lling a di: y hoi e I s small, the risk of
dri 1 1 1 i ig ai ,. l ineconomi c we] 3 i s s t::ii ] ] si gi ii f i c a n t ,
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the

fact that there is not an uneconomic well on the Drilling Unit is
also only one factor in deciding the risk of drilling the Miles
Well.

The fact that the Tew Well is an economical well does not

guarantee that the Miles Well will be an economical well.
Mr. Laramie testified that the cost of a well in the
Altamont/Bluebell Field was in the neighborhood of $1.75 to 2
million (TR, page 15). A well that is not a dry hole may produce
insufficient oil and gas to pay for itself.

If a well costs $2

million, but only produces $1 million worth of oil, it is clearly
not a dry hole but on the other hand, it is certainly not an
economic well.
Any investment to drill a well is risky.

The well may

not produce as much as expected, the price of oil may drop, the
well may blow out and many other unforeseen events may occur.
The parties investing in the well are agreeing to pay for the
cost of drilling the well, regardless of the success of the well.
These parties do not have any guarantee that they will ever
recover their money and have taken a large risk in drilling the
Miles Well.
Bennion has not assumed any portion of this risk.
Bennion is not liable for any of the costs of the well out of his
pocket.

The costs of drilling attributable to his share will not

be paid by Bennion, but will be paid by the consenting parties.
If the Miles Well is successful, then the consenting parties will
be able to recover these costs out of production.
-20-

If the Miles

Well p r o d u c e s less than e n o u g h oil to pay for itself,

Bennion

would r e c e i v e s u b s t a n t i a l r o y a l t i e s whi J e t h e c o n s e n t i n g

parties

would h a v e lost m o n e y .
There

is

c

i b i d e m <j h i

-nl i s t m i l m l

iii]ipnit

t h<

f i n d i n g t h a t a 1 75% n o n c o n s e n t p e n a l t y i s r e a s o n a b l e i n
case.

Burinf"1

this

The n o n c o n s e n t p e n a l t y h a s b e e n a p p l i e d _.. a

c o i i s t i t: i i I: I c:> i I a II £ a s 1 I I o n .
B e f o r e leaving this section, ANR m u s t n o t e that
B e n n i o n f s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of t h e c a s e of W i n d s o r G a s C o r p . v.
Railroad C o m m i s s i o n of Texas, 529 S• W 2d

• • * ( T e x , Ci v, A p p .

1 9 7 5 ) is m i s l e a d i n g and c o n t a i n s incorrect

statements

s

^ Texas

*f

Railroad CommIssIoi I i:egu 1 a 1:es 1:1 ie oi 1 ai Ic:3

• s

The Texas Railroad Commission is authorized under the Texas
Mineral Interest Pooling Ae1 :, Tex. Nat. Res
et seq. (Vernoi

1 978)

Code Ann

§§102,001

In fun t" pniiJ ret tain i ntei cvst s i II a ' ' if a. i r

and r e a s o n a b l e o f f e r to v o l u n t a r i l y p o o l " is m a d e b e f o r e t h e
force p o o l i n g a p p l i c a t i o n is m a d e .

•*-

liI Windsor

W i n d s o r t o v o l u n t a r y pool included a proposal
w e l l s on a take it or leave i t b a s i s ,

-ffer m a d e by

*

.

eiaht

Wilson, t h e p a r t y W i n d s o r

w a s a t t e m p t i n g t o for ce poo] , could e i t h e r a g r e e to p a y for all •
eight ( 8 ) w e l l s o r b e s u b j e c

+n a 9 +-o

p e n a l t y on al1 eight (8) w e l l s .

\•) nonconsent

The Texas Railroad

di smissed W:i i id sot 's a) \\\ I i < w t inn*

Commission

f m fori f pnol inc.) "'iiiiri mi Liir

and r e a s o n a b l e o f f e r to v o l u n t a r i l y pool w a s not m a d e to Wilson.
The Court a f f i r m e d t h e T e x a s R a i l r o a d ' s r e f u s a l t o e n t e r a force

pooling order.

It did not invalidate a force pooling order as

stated in Bennion's Brief (Bennion's Brief at 17). Nor did the
Court of Appeals state that any part of its decision rested upon
the fact that the operators were not taking any risks in drilling
the wells as stated in Bennion's Brief (Bennion's Brief at page
17).

The Court of Civil Appeals did recite testimony that

drilling in the area had an 84.6% percent success rate.

This

implies that more than one out of eight wells were not successful
which is certainly not risk free.

Finally, the Court of Civil

Appeals did not hold that a Forced Pooling Order with a 2 to 1
risk factor was not fair and reasonable as stated in Bennion's
Brief (Bennion's Brief at page 17).

The court actually held

"that appellant's offer for the initial drilling of eight
drilling units on a 'take it all' or 'leave it all' basis, and
with a two-to-one risk factor, was not a 'fair and reasonable
offer to voluntarily pool'" (Windsor at 837).
C. THE BOARD WAS CORRECT IN MODIFYING THE ORIGINAL
POOLING ORDER.
1.

Board Has The Authority Under The Act To Amend

Pooling Orders.
The administrative mandate given to the Board by the
Utah Legislature ranges from the very broad (Utah Code Ann.
§ 40-6-5(1), "The board has jurisdiction over all persons and
property necessary to enforce this chapter" and Utah Code Ann. §
40-6-5(3) (a), "The board has the authority to regulate: (a) all
-22-

operations tor and related to Ihp prnd
to the very specific (Utah Code Ann, § 40-6-6(5),

")
r v board may

enter an order pooling .- . ; interests in 1 he drilling unit for the
development: and oper a 5

. ties t 101 lal» 1 y , '' t ri1 > " ••;

l>

PI ' nd

Pooling Statute authorizes the Board to pool involuntarily the
unleased mineral interest
of tl ie other o\ im

' Bennion with the worki:

interests

! 1 1 i :ig i u li !:::.

The following examples in the Act demonstrate that the
need to modify orders is an integral part of the EK
responsibility in ca: rying oilr its mandate to conserve and
regulate the production

: n l nnd gay :* r^ sr.atu __ jiah.Uta! I

Code Ann. § 40-6-6 (1988), p.« \ M*(2) The Board may modify the order ' >
provide an exception to the authorized
location of a well when the board finds such
a modification to be reasonably necessary.
(3) An order establishing drilling
units for a pool shall cover a] 1 lands
determined by the board to be underlaid by
the pool, and the order may he modified
by
the Board to> include additional areas
determined to be underlaid by the pool.
(4)
The Board may modify the
order to decrease or increase the size of
drilling units or permit additional wells : i
be drilled within the established units.
(Emphasis adde :I )
Between the time of the original 1981 Order dated April
30, 1981, and the hearing in this matter on May 24, 1990,,,, the Ac f
had been amended IJ.9J M) .irnJl the Board had issued the 1985 Order
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affecting this and other lands in the Altamont/Bluebell Field
allowing for two producing wells in each drilling unit.

In order

to enforce the mandatory nonconsent penalty contained in the Act,
the Board had to modify the 1981 Order.

Clearly, the Board had

the authority to amend the 1981 Order.
Just as the Board has the legislative authority to
formulate a compulsory pooling order, the Board must also have
the authority to amend or otherwise modify its forced pooling
orders.

To decide to the contrary would force the Board into the

untenable position of having to decide once and for all time all
matters that could affect the pooled unit, even when
circumstances could change dramatically.

In this case, the

circumstances and conditions under which the 1981 Order was
entered have changed.

The statute has changed to allow the Board

to authorize more than one well on a spacing unit.

The Board may

also increase or decrease the size of a spacing unit.

The body

of geologic and production knowledge in the Altamont/Bluebell
Field has expanded.

We now know that one well will not drain the

640-acre drilling unit established under the existing pooling
order, and the Board has expressly so found.

1985 Order at 5.

The 1985 Order has now authorized the drilling of a second
production well in a drilling unit.
changes are significant.

Id. at 8.

Certainly, these

ANR cannot imagine how changes of the

nature contemplated by the general rule could be more significant
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than those i i i this matter or be nioi e worthy of meriting an
amendment of the existing order.
Although the Utah courts have not ruled on the issue,
other oil and gas producing state courts have resoundingly
endorsed the an itf lor i t::j o f ai i aclfi ti i :i i sti: at:! ve agei icy char ged wi th
the regulation of the oil ai id gas industry to change or modify
its orders.

Railroad Commission v. Aluminum Co. of America, 380

S.W.2d 599 (Tex . 19(M! ) -it

(A)/:

the Commission's power to regulate oil
and gas production in the interest of
conservation and protection of correlative
rights is a continuing one and its orders are
subject to change or modification where
conditions have changed materially, new and
unforseen problems arise or mistakes are
discovered.
See also, Vierson v. Bennett, 353 P.2d

r

Spiers v. Magnolia Petroleum to
(1951); see generally, 6 H. WTLi-IAM^ hAL
LAW, § 947 (1989); i >
AND UN ITIZ AT 10!1 I,

\ ;-„„ ,,

^ 1 1 ^ i fJKJ -=*

KRAMER AND *
et set],

.

^EYERS,

2

AM

GAS

MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING
i

i 11" 11 i I

In analyzing Bennion's arguments in support of his
claim that the Board cannot amend an or der because he has a
vested i ICJM

i

t u> 1 i 1 i im| H i i i 1 i»ecomes clear that Bennion

has confused the issue of a vested property right and the
obligation to pay his share *M the
the

• • :

-

any property rights

u : .

dri 1 li ng cost.

In i n<

Board has i IO t divested Bennion of

3ennion still owns his mineral interest and
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has the right to receive his just share of production.

The only

thing that has changed is the pooling order now contains a
provision on how Bennion's share of the cost of drilling the
Miles Well is to be paid.
It should be remembered that the Original Pooling Order
did not address the drilling of future wells.

It did not, as

required by statute, provide for a nonconsent penalty if a party
elected not to participate

in a future well.

The Board just did

not foresee in 1981 that an additional well would be drilled.
Bennion's reliance upon the Oklahoma cases holding a
pooling order pools the entire unit and not the wellbore is
misplaced.

The Utah Forced Pooling Statutes and the Oklahoma

Forced Pooling Statutes are completely different.

In Oklahoma, a

party can lose the right to participate in the entire unit for
all time if he does not participate and pay his share of the
costs of the first well on the unit.
The Pooling Order in Inexco Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Corp.
Commission, 767 P.2d 404 (Ok. 1988) required:
the owners to either participate by
paying their share of the costs of drilling
and completing the well or elect to accept a
bonus. The owners could accept a cash bonus
of $1,250 per acre plus an overriding or
excess royalty of 1/16 of 8/8, or a non-cash
bonus of an overriding or excess royalty of
1/8 of 8/8. Id. at 405.
In Amoco Production v. Corp. Commission of Oklahoma 751 P.2d 203
(Ok. App. 1986) ("Amoco I") the nonconsenting owner was required
-26-

to f armout its interest and retail
r o y a 1 f y , w t i« M

i •' i i' i

•:;

; 6/ 8ths excess

i tJI J \' ( i I n

• ,

:

,=> i n t h e ini • .. ,•: i

w e l l . Id, at 2 0 5 .
This w a s also t h e case :•
Commission of Oklahoma,
II").

^

-nioco p r o ( j u c ^ : : [ o n

..

(W*

a ^

IQDTX

v>

cor p.

("Amoco

T h e pooling order provided:
for ai I election by the owners of
interests i n t h e drilling and spacing unit.
The owners could either elect to participate
in the working interests in the unit well, or
elect 1. accept a cash bonus plus an override
in lie,; (f ^ ^ t i c i p a t i o n
Id at 8 3 6 .

This election .: keepinc ^ working interest and paying the cost
of drilling

i: ki i Ig i i i11

an overriding royalty interest w a s also described

.11 i eceiving on 1 y
in Helmerich &

Payne, Inc. v. Corp. Commission of Oklahoma, 532 P,2d 419 (Ok.
1975).

TI i e p o o 1 i i i g o i d e i: p i o v i d e d:
that the sum of $30.00 per acre or no
cash bonus but an override of 1/16 of 7/8 on
oil and 1/8 of 7/8 on gas is hereby fixed as
a fair and reasonable bonus to be paid any
party whose interest is pooled herein in lieu
of his right to participate in the working
interest of any and all unit wells in which
he has an interest.

Id. at 420.
and that
In the event any owner of an outstanding
leasehold estate does not desire to
participate in the development of the ninesection area, he shall be awarded a bonus,
either in cash or in overriding royalty, as
set out above, in lieu thereof; and he shall
be required to elect within 1 5 days fr om the
-27-

date of this Order whether he desires to
accept the bonus herein established for all
his interests in any and all of the nine
drilling and spacing units, and the type of
bonus he elects to receive, or whether he
desires to participate in the development
program under one of the alternatives set out
above.
Id. at 420-21.
The issue in each of these cases (except Helmerich &
Payne) was whether the election of converting one's interest from
a working interest to a royalty interest applied only to the
first well or the entire unit.

Each court which faced the issue

held that the order provided that the election was on a unit-wide
basis and by electing not to participate in the initial well,
then nonconsenting party, in essence, conveyed their working
interest in the unit and reserved a royalty interest in the unit.
The Utah Forced Pooling Statute is dramatically
different from the Oklahoma forced pooling statute.

In Utah when

an unleased mineral interest owner, such as Bennion, elects not
to participate in the drilling of a well, then he will be paid a
royalty until the consenting parties recover the nonconsent
penalty.

At that point, he is entitled to participate in the

well and the drilling unit as a working interest owner.
In this case, the Tew Well paid out in May, 1976, prior
to Bennion?s interest in the Tew Well being force pooled.
Bennion v. Utah State Board of Oil. Gas and Mining. 675 P.2d 1135
(Utah 1983).

Bennion has participated in the Tew Well and the
-28-

Drilling Unit as an unleased mineral interest owner

when the

Miles W e J 1 \ i a s p i o p c .* ? s t / d B fj 1111 J i > 11 » m i J < I f i n n / e t * 11 M led to p a r t i c i p a
as an unleased mineral interest owner.
so.

H e did not elect to do

TR, pages 1 4-1 f*
1

me

Bennion is requirec *
he elected rr *• +^ rv
issue <
the unit.
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t r, subject t ,.•
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%rl ie

lurt is whether

zionconsent penalty since

-s snare oi d i i n i
^ owns an unleased mineral u teiest in

i
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.

;:. :ispute.
St-'itir* e, mandates that «i pooling

The Forced '

order provide fnr a nonconsent penalty.

"The order shall provide

that each consenting owner shall be entitled to receive . . . Ilis
proportionate p*nr 1 nil tin i mi nnseiit imj nwni'i " i "-thiii

if such

production until costs are recovered as provided
subsection",

, t*h Code Ann. ^ 40-6-6

include the

•

-

\

K±9Bo),

u uusts

• • extent tha; the 1 Q P 1

>•;.-•:..

Order does not include a nonconsent penalty then <
violation of this provision.
The oi lly i ssi ie that tine Oklahoma cases raise is whether
the nonconsent penalty should be recovered from the production
from the unit .. * whether it should be recovered fion1 pi od^i: t icin
- : • • : i wel 1
recovered .:>•

f

basis.

The Order provides that it Is to be

- •/ wel J basis.

itself is not as •. N • a;=.

The Forced Pooling Statute
II ret ei cnees i ecuvering
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costs out of "the well" and "the unit."

See Utah Code Ann. §

40-6-6(6).
ANR believes that by applying the nonconsent penalty to
each well separately, then the rights of the nonconsenting owner
in the first well will be protected.

By determining that the

costs of drilling the second well can only be collected from
production from the second well, then the nonconsenting owner
will continue to receive revenues from the first well.

If it

were unit wide, Bennion would cease to recover revenues from the
Tew Well until the Miles Well paid out.
This Court had the chance to interpret a prior version
of this statute in a different fact situation in Bennion v. Gulf
Oil Corp,, 716 P.2d 267 (Utah 1985).

That case involved a second

well but arose prior to the 1985 Order which allowed two wells to
be produced at one time.

Gulf drilled the first well on the unit

that had been forced pooled.
interest in the unit.

Bennion owned an unleased mineral

Gulf drilled a second well, shut-in the

first well and attempted to charge Bennion, as a nonconsenting
mineral interest owner, his share of the cost of drilling the
second well.

This Court held that a nonconsenting owner's rights

in the first well should not be trampled by the drilling of a
second well.
That decision is not applicable in this case, since the
Board has been given the authority to allow a second well to be
drilled.

The Board's discretion in allowing the costs to be
-30-

recovered on;

(

*

~,

is supported by the reasoning of that case in protecting the
rights of the owners in thp first well.
the i 101 iconsei 1 t penally' " «u

It the Court orders that

mi , i M « dppiii'ti o

'

ide basis,

the:.n Bennion wi 1 1 receive decreased revenues from the Tew We J J
until the Miles Well pays out.
2.

Bennion Has Waived His Claim That A Pooling Order

Cannot Be Amended.
Bennion has waived his cla
Order may not be modi* led --v : a new nonconsent penalty cannot be
imposed by claiming rights under the Forced Pooling Statute that
are not included ii

8 1 OMfei .

The 1977 version of the Forced Pooling Statute
provided:
a nonconsenting owner of a tract in a
drilling unit, which is not subject to any
lease or other contract for the development
thereof for oil and gas, shall be deemed to
have a basic landowners 1 royalty of 1/8, or
12-1/2%,
:>i the production allocated to such
tract.
Utah Code Ann. § 4';-.' < •

.197 \i (emphasis added].

The 1983 versi •

mi'd I'oni imj Stdtule requires

that a forced pooling order provide that:
.,?! nonconsenting owner of a tract in a
drilling unit, which is not subject to a
lease or other contract for the development
of oil and gas, shall receive as a royalty
the average landowners royalty
attributable
to each tract within the dn'ib'ng unat,
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determined prior to the commencement of
drilling and payable from the production
allocated to each tract until the consenting
owners have recovered the costs as provided
in Subsection (6)."
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(7)(b) (1988) [emphasis added].
Since the Tew Well had been drilled and had paid out
when the Forced Pooling Order was entered in 1981, the 1981 Order
did not include a provision for the payment of royalties in the
future.

The only reference to royalty was a calculation of

"Royalty Interest Accumulations" which were stated to be "Based
on a one-eighth cost free royalty, proportionately reduced, until
payout.

Upon payout this royalty merges with and is included in

the working interest." (1981 Order at 5).

The 1981 Order also

provides that Shell shall pay Bennion interest on "Bennionfs
statutory royalty." (1981 Order at 7).

There is no provision in

the 1981 Order to pay royalties in the future.
Even though the 1981 Order did not specifically provide
for royalty payments in the future and stated that the royalty
merged with the working interest when pay out occurred in 1976,
Bennion demanded and claimed that he is entitled by statute to a
royalty.

In the hearing in May, 1990, the following statements

were made:
MR. LARAMIE: Yes. If Mr. Bennion would have agreed to
participate in the well based on actual costs, he would
have had to pay about $60,000. Under the statute, he
will still be paid a royalty interest based on the
average royalty in the field. He will not receive
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nothing until the well is paid out, but he
will have received a royalty rate based on an
average of the royalty paid in the field.
• MR. McINTYRE: Is there any way you car - -. ve me a
figure on that?
MR. LARAMIE:

Yes, it would be about 13,89 percent

MR. STIRBA: But, remember, just so it's clear, that's
statutorily mandated, and that's only one-eighth, or in
this case, what—a percentage of his share that he's
otherwise entitled to. (TR a* page 62).
Mr.

Stirba, who • .* representi.^n Bennion at thf

hearing, was assert:'

UiaL ben

royalty based upon t:.u statute and not tht- 1961 Order.
clear whether he was. claiming h

- royalty

l

:- lot

-^ r y a l ^ v .
< r>

In either case, he we

lf

-r •

was not included in the 19 81 Order.
Ii I e s s e n c e , w h a t B e n n i o n

is c l a i m i n g ii i hi s appeal .is

t h a t A N R i s nol enl it Ird hi i e u e L \/t» <i u o n c o n s e n t p e n a l t y tor
financing the Miles Well which is "statutorily mandated11 since
the 1981 Order did not contaifut1 •'

.

•

pena l t w

specific provision providing h'M'
< >T the other hand, Bennion is

claiming a royalty even though thee 198J
provision for it* payment of royalty,
; *- -n^--«
amendment

** *

ni

idf»i does not contain a

Reunion i

unking

Mus

provision ol the 1981 Order or a future
-:-J

- ier, but because i t is contained in the

Forced Pooling Statute.
Bennion has

in essence, admitted that the 1981 Order

should be and can be amended to include the payment of royalties
: *-

until payout based upon the statute.

At the same time he is

claiming that: the 1981 Order cannot be amended to provide for a
nonconsent penalty since it does not benefit him.

He cannot have

it both ways; by his actions, Bennion has waived his claim that
the 1981 Order cannot be amended.
3.

The Boards Order Is Consistent With The

Declaration Of Public Interest.
The Board's Order protects the correlative rights of
all owners and is consistent with the Declaration of Public
Interest.

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1 provides:
It is declared.to be in the public
interest to foster, encourage, and promote
the development, production and utilization
of natural resources of oil and gas in the
state of Utah in such a manner as will
prevent waste; to authorize and to provide
for the operation and development of oil and
gas properties in such a manner that a
greater ultimate recovery of oil and gas may
be obtained and that the correlative rights
of all owners may be fully protected.
As discussed previously, the legislature specified in

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6 how the correlative rights of both the
consenting and nonconsenting parties are to be protected when a
well is drilled.

The legislature concluded that if a party would

not agree to pay its share of the cost of drilling a well, then
the consenting party should be compensated for the additional
risk.

The legislature mandated that the nonconsenting party, in

return for having a well drilled on its behalf by the consenting

-34-

owners, shall be subject to a nonconsent penalty of iou

Bennion f s argument is essentially that the application
of the provisions of the statute implement i M , " " .« I '(.M, 1 ai at i 01 .1
Put ) 1 1c 11 I te:i : est u i o 1 a tes 111c declaration u 1 Public Interest,
Bennion f s and ANR f s correlative rights are being protected as
required by statute.
Bennion.

A well has hoon ii» i ! loci «;":il m > i isk l.<

Bern lion is receiving 1: lis share ^i jevenues fron the Tew

Well without deduction for the costs cf *»'«=- vil^? w^I
is receiving royalties *

3ennion

•

c ' ->e

liable for any of the cubts ui oiiiling the Miles He , except out
of production.

ANR

._• other consenting owners have invested

substantial

*- recover those

investments and are entitled by statute to a nonconsent penalty.
The Declaration of Public Interest i c - ^ n ^
piotectic.

- iust Bennion.

TN- protection rf

correlative rights ;: accordance with the provisions o+ t-.
Forced Pooling Statute does not viol at P thp- n*

- - ,

ic

JSt.

D.

THE 1985 ORDER DOES NOT REQUIRE NOR ALLOW ANR TO

PETITION THE BOARD FOR THE RIGHT TO DRILL THE MILES WELL.
The 1985 Order does net require any evidence ol
economic feasibility tu t<e pirs-

ti

--

k

jes not

i: eqi lire the Board to make a determinationi truat 1 he second well be
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economically feasible prior to its drilling.

Sections C and D of

the 1985 Order provide:
C. Additional wells may be drilled at
the option of the operator
of the unit, based
upon geologic and engineering data for that
unit which will justify the drilling of an
additional well in order to recover
additional oil, provided the additional well
appears to be economically feasible.
D. Economically feasible means that a
prudent operator would have a reasonable
opportunity to recover the costs of drilling,
completing, producing and operating the well,
plus a reasonable profit.
[Emphasis added.]
There is no requirement that evidence of economic
feasibility be presented to the Board.

There is no requirement

that the Board make a determination of economic feasibility prior
to the drilling a second well.

In fact, there is nothing in the

Order to base Bennion?s argument upon.

Bennion, in fact, had to

fabricate out of thin air an alleged quotation to begin his
argument.
Bennion1s brief at page 34 contains the following
quotation:

"An additional well could be drilled at the option of

the operator provided the well appears to be economically
feasible." [emphasis omitted].

This sentence does not appear in

the 1985 Order, nor does it appear in the Order entered by the
Board in Docket No. 90-021, Cause No. 139-63 which is being
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appealed by Bennion.

Fabricated statements cannot be the basis

of an appeal.
A reading of what the 1985 Order actually states shows
that "Additional wells may be drilled at the option
operator

of the unit"

of

the

(Section C, 1985 Order) [emphasis added]

and not the determination of the Board.
The requirement that the Board review the economic
feasibility of every second well would be a major departure from
the Board's prior practice.

The economic feasibility of first

wells are not reviewed by the Board.

The economic feasibility of

replacement wells are not reviewed by the Board.

If the Board

had intended to require operators to appear before the Board and
convince the Board that a second well was economically feasible
before it could be drilled, it would have clearly stated such
requirement.
In fact, if the Board had intended to make such a
requirement it would have enforced its own order.

The Court can

take judicial notice of the fact that numerous second wells have
been drilled under the 1985 Order and the board has not required
any operator to supply evidence of economic feasibility.

In this

case, the Board knew that the Miles Well was spudded prior to the
hearing (See Order Finding of Facts 8 and 9), yet did not require
ANR to cease operations or furnish evidence of economic
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feasibility.

The Operator is to determine if he desires to drill

an additional well.
ANR respectfully requests this Court to take judicial
notice of the transcript in Docket No. 85-007, Cause No. 139-42
in which the Board entered the 1985 Order.

A review of the

transcript from Docket No. 85-007, Cause No. 139-42, shows that
the intent of Sections C and D of the 1985 Order was to protect
the Operator from being forced to drill uneconomic wells while
preventing the Operator from escaping its duty under the implied
covenant to develop contained in typical oil and gas leases.

The

application to drill additional wells was intended to encourage
but not require additional drilling (1985 TR, page 14). Frank
Douglas, the attorney for ANR and the other petitioners in the
1985 hearing, argued that the operator should be left with the
decision to drill a second well and not the Board or another
party (1985 TR, pages 21-23, 34-36).

ANR presented testimony

that the parties that can make the best decision to drill or not
to drill a seicond well are the operator and the parties who
invest money in the well.

(1985 TR, pages 126, 162-163, 185)

The Board's staff expressed concern about leaving the decision to
drill a second well solely with the Operator, but supported the
proposed order if it contained language which would make clear
that the order would define economic feasibility and not modify
the traditional lessor/lessee relationship (1985 TR, pages 21,
237).
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Bow Valley Petroleum, Koch Exploration Company, Sonat
Exploration Company and Phillips Petroleum also expressed
concerns that the Operator should make the decision to drill a
second well (1985 TR, pages 38-39, 217-18, 238-43).
In closing arguments Mr. Pruitt, attorney for ANR and
the other petitioners, stated:
The petition is to allow additional
wells without the necessity of coming before
the Board on an individual well by well basis
to drill each additional well. That's never
been desirable, and we want to keep that
foremost in your mind as you consider this
matter. The concern that has been expressed
by numerous parties, operators, and
nonoperators and royalty owners alike seems
to focus really on the nonexercise of the
option, or perhaps a way in which to force an
operator to drill a certain well out of order
or to drill a well of questionable merit
(1985 TR, page 251).
To implement this, ANR and the other petitioners
offered to amend their proposed order.

Mr. Pruitt read some of

these provisions which included:
"(C) Additional wells may be drilled at
the option of the operator of the unit based
upon geologic and engineering data for that
unit which will justify the drilling of an
additional well in order to recover
additional oil, provided the additional well
appears to be economically and geologically
feasible in the judgment of the operator.
"(D) Economically feasible means that
the operator has a reasonable opportunity to
recover the costs of drilling, completing,
producing, and operating the well, plus a
reasonable profit."
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(1985 TR, at pages 254-55) [emphasis in original].
The final 1985 Order changed the proposed phrase
"provided the additional

well appears to be economically

and

geologically feasible in the judgment of the operator" to
"provided the additional well appears to be

economically

feasible."
A discussion on this change occurred between Hugh
Garner, attorney for Coastal Oil & Gas Corporation, and Chairman
Williams, as follows:
MR. GARNER: It strikes me that we should, instead
of basing it solely,on the economic, we should
bring into it both the geologic and the
engineering aspect.
CHAIRMAN WILLIAMS:
to?

Which paragraph are you referring

MR. GARNER: I'm looking at paragraph (c) on page
7. The language has been limited by saying,
"appears to be economically feasible."
CHAIRMAN WILLIAMS: Our reason for that change is
because we did not want to get into the business
of singling out components of an economic
determination.
It seems to me that there are several components,
and we wanted to leave those as they are without
appearing to be selecting from among them. So we
thought that we were making it broader, leaving it
an open--a true economic determination based on
all factors, including geologic factors.
MR. GARNER: Are we still looking at this in terms
of the judgment of the operators? I see that
language has been struck also.
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CHAIRMAN WILLIAMS: We tried to incorporate
what
we think is the existing
condition
now, which is a
prudent operator standard.
I think it is in the judgment of the operator,
but his
judgment has to be sound and not arbitrary. That was
what we were doing with paragraph (d). We changed the
concept. We stated it in a different fashion. (1985
TR, page 258) [emphasis added].
The Board intended that the determination to drill a
second well be the same as it was for the first well i.e. the
prudent operator test.

The prudent operator standard is the test

for determining if an operator or lessee has breached an implied
covenant such as the implied covenant of reasonable development.
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS, WILLIAMS AND MEYERS, Sixth Edition
(1984).
If an operator wants to drill a well he decides if it
will be economic.

The Operator does not need to obtain a

determination from the Board that the well is economic.

On the

other hand, if an operator refuses to drill a well and a lessor
can show that the operator is in breach of its implied covenant
to develop, then the 1985 Order does not protect the operator for
its failure to drill.
E. THE COURT SHOULD NOT DISTURB THE BOARD'S FINDINGS OF
FACT BECAUSE THE RECORD SUPPORTS THOSE FINDINGS.
1.

The Standard for Review is "Substantial Evidence.

This Court recently established standards to be
utilized in the review of findings of fact and conclusions of law
by the an administrative agency.

In First National Bank of
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Boston v. County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 799
P.2D 1163 (1990), the Court stated that the Administrative
Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to 22 (1989), requires
the
. . . appellate court to review the
"whole record" to determine whether the
agency's action is "supported by substantial
evidence." "Substantial evidence" is that
quantum and quality of relevant evidence that
is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to
support a conclusion. See Consolo v. FMC,
383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 1026-27, 16
L.Ed.2d 131 (1966); Idaho State Ins. Fund v.
Hunnicutt,
110 Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927,
930-31 (1985); Grace Drilling
v. Board of
Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct.App. 1989).
An appellate court applying the "substantial
evidence test" must consider both the
evidence that supports the Tax Commission's
factual findings and the evidence that
detracts from the findings. Nevertheless,
the party challenging the findings — in this
case, the taxpayer—must marshal all of the
evidence supporting the findings and show
that despite the supporting facts, the Tax
Commission's findings are not supported by
substantial evidence.
799 P.2d 1163, 1165 [certain citations in footnotes included].
Assuming that the Act is constitutional and that the
Board had the authority to amend its orders, the case before the
Court becomes a review of factual determinations made by the
Board which led to the legal conclusion that an imposition of a
175% nonconsent penalty is fair to all parties, and that such a
finding is consistent with the purposes of the Act.
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2.

The Review of Evidence is not a Trial de Novo.

In

reviewing the findings of the Board, the Court should not
substitute its own conclusions it might have reached had it been
the original trier of fact.

In Grace Drilling v. Board of

Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct.App. 1989), the court said:
In undertaking such a review, this court
will not substitute its judgment as between
two reasonably conflicting views, even though
we may have come to a different conclusion
had the case come before us for de novo
review, [Citations omitted]. It is the
province of the Board, not appellate courts,
to resolve conflicting evidence, and where
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the
same evidence, it is for the Board to draw
the inferences.
776 P.2d 63, 68.
F.
THE COURT SHOULD GIVE DEFERENCE TO THE BOARD'S
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON ITS FINDINGS OF FACTS.
1.
The Board's Expertise is Needed to Make the
Findings in this Case.
In First National Bank of Boston v. County Board of
Equalization of Salt Lake County, supra, the Court recognized
that the expertise of the administrative agencies must be
considered by the appellate court.

The expertise, however, must

be applied in a manner consistent with the agency's legislative
mandate.
Although it is a "universally recognized
rule" that this court must "take some
cognizance of the expertise of the agency in
its particular field and accordingly to give
some deference to its determination," Utah
Power & Light Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 590
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P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1979), the agency's
decision must rest upon some sound
evidentiary basis, not a creation of fiat.
Hurley v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 767 P.2d 524, 526-27
(Utah 1988); Utah Power & Light. 590 P.2d at 335; 799 P.2d 1163,
1166 [footnotes included].
The Utah State Legislature has empowered the Board
under the Forced Pooling Statute to establish drilling units and
to set, when appropriate, levels of nonconsent penalties. In
reaching its findings, the Board heard extensive testimony,
examined exhibits submitted by the parties, and heard arguments
of counsel from both parties.

Based on these factors, the Board

made factual findings and conclusions of law, which rested on a
"sound evidentiary basis."

See also Utah Department of

Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d
601 (Utah 1983), where this Court said:
In reviewing decisions such as these, a
court should afford great deference to the
technical expertise or more extensive
experience of the responsible agency.
658 P.2d 601, 610.
Because of the experience of the Board and its
understanding of the complexities of drilling and pooling orders,
we would urge this Court to give deference to the Board's
findings which have been amply supported by the record.

The

members of the Board come from a cross section of interests and
backgrounds. Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-4(2) provides:
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2. The board shall then consist of
seven members appointed by the governor, with
the advice and consent of the Senate• No
more than four members shall be from the same
political party. The members shall have the
following qualifications:
(a) two members knowledgeable
in mining matters;
(b) two members knowledgeable
in oil and gas matters;
(c) one member knowledgeable
in ecological and environmental
matters;
(d) one member who is a
private land owner, owns a mineral
or royalty interest and is
knowledgeable in those interests;
and
(e) one member who is
knowledgeable in geological
matters.
Each of these individuals has been chosen to give the
Board the necessary breadth of experience to review natural
resource matters.
2.

The Boardf s Legal Conclusion was Supported by the

Record as a Whole.
In the case of Utah Department of Administrative
Services v. Public Service Commission, supra, the Court explained
that factual questions sometimes lead to determinations of
"special law", which, by their very nature, require the expertise
of the agency empowered by the legislature to make such
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decisions.

The Court in reviewing such findings of special laws,

held that considerable weight should be given to such findings.
Also among these intermediate issues are
the Commission's decisions on what can be
called questions of "special law." These are
the Commission's interpretations of the
operative provisions of the statutory law it
is empowered to administer, especially those
generalized terms that bespeak a legislative
intent to delegate their interpretation to
the responsible agency. In reviewing agency
decisions of this type, we apply what we have
called the "time honored rule of law . . .
that the construction of statutes by
governmental agencies charged with their
administration should be given considerable
weight . . . ."
658 P.2d 601, at page 610 (citing McPhie v. Industrial
Commission, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977); West Jordan v.
Department of Employment Security, 656 P.2d 411 (Utah 1982).
Because of the extensive record in this matter, there
was sufficient evidence to support the findings of fact and the
conclusions of law contained in the Order of the Board, and the
Court should give "considerable weight" to the Board's
interpretation of the Forced Pooling Statute.
VIII.

CONCLUSION
The issues which have been raised in this appeal have

involved significant constitutional matters.

Bennion's brief has

largely failed to demonstrate through the citation of applicable
case law any constitutional basis for attacking the Forced
Pooling Statute.

Nor has he marshalled the evidence from the
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record to support his contentions that the board acted
inappropriately in making its Order.
The Forced Pooling Statute is constitutional.

It is a

fair and reasonable application of the state's police power.

It

has also been implemented in this case in a fair and reasonable
way by the Board.

The Board's Order enforcing the mandatory

provisions of the Forced Pooling Statute should be upheld.

We

urge the Court to deny Bennion's appeal.
DATED February 21, 1991.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

John P. Harrington
Alan A. Enke
Attorneys for ANR Production
Company
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Exhibit A to Addendum

BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE
REQUEST FOR AGENCY ACTION
OF ANR PRODUCTION COMPANY
FOR AN ORDER SPECIFYING
COSTS TO BE PAID BY S.H.
BENNION AS A NON-CONSENTING
OWNER UNDER FORCED POOLING
ORDER COVERING SECTION 1,
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE
5W-USM, DUCHESNE COUNTY,
UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER
DOCKET NO. 90-021
CAUSE NO. 139-63

Pursuant to the Request for Agency Action of ANR
Production Company (ANR), this cause was initially heard before
the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, Department of Natural
Resources, on Thursday, May 24, 1990, at 10:00 a.m. in the
Boardroom of the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining, 355 West North
Temple, 3 Triad Center, Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah.
At the hearing of May 24, 1990, arguments of the
parties were heard.. The following Board members were present at
the hearing:
James W. Carter, Acting Chairman
Richard B. Larsen
Judy F. Lever
E. Steele Mclntyre
Kent G. Stringham
Chairman Gregory P. Williams having recused himself, as
well as board member John M. Garr

The Board was represented by Alan S. Bachman, Esq.,
Assistant Attorney General for the State of Utah.
Appearances for the Division for Oil, Gas and Mining
were made by Dianne Nielson, Director, Oil, Gas and Mining, and
Ronald J. Firth, Associate Director, Oil and Gas, and John R.
Baza, Petroleum Engineer.
ANR was represented by John Harrington, Esq., and David
M. Laraime, Sr. Landman.

Bennion was represented by Peter

Stirba, Esq,
The Board took the matter under advisement and
requested legal counsel from the Office of the Attorney General
of the State of Utah.
On or about June 26, 1990, the Secretary of the Board
transmitted to Petitioner, Respondent's counsel and the Division
of Oil, Gas and Mining the list of six issues with respect to
which the Board wished further legal briefing.

On July 25, 1990,

after receiving leave to file Amicus Curiae, Rocky Mountain Oil
and Gas Association (RMOGA) filed a Brief and Response to the
questions presented by the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining on June
21, 1990.

The parties Briefs have been considered by the Board.

On August 23, 1990, pursuant to notice, a continuation of the
original hearing was held in the Boardroom of the Division of
Oil, Gas and Mining, 355 West North Temple, 3 Triad Center, Suite
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301, Salt Lake City, Utah.

The following Board members were

present:
James W. Carter, Acting Chairman
Richard B. Larsen
Judy F. Lever
E. Steele Mclntyre
Kent G. Stringham
Chairman Gregory P. Williams having recused himself, as
well as board member John M. Garr.
The Board was represented by Thomas A. Mitchell, Esq.,
Assistant Attorney General for the State of Utah.
Appearances for the Division for Oil, Gas and Mining
were made by Ronald J. Firth, Associate Director, Oil and Gas.
Neither the Petitioners nor Respondent were present.
NOW THEREFORE, the Board, having considered the
testimony adduced and the exhibits reviewed in all said hearings
and being fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Due and regular notice of the time, place and

purpose of the May 24, 1990 hearing was given to all interested
parties as required by law and the rules and regulations of the
Board.

ANR put on evidence regarding the cost of drilling to

date and the estimated costs of drilling to completion of the
Miles 2-1B5 well.

Further, ANR presented testimony and other

evidence of its position concerning the risk incurred by the
consenting interest owners in the drilling of the Miles 2-1B5

181

well.

S.H. Bennion, through counsel, argued the legal points set

forth in his written response, but submitted no evidence in
rebuttal to ANR's evidence concerning risk of drilling on the
Miles 2-1B5 well. The cause was continued by the Board and
further argument in the form of briefs to specific questions of
the Board has been provided by counsel and Amicus Curiae.

This

cause was heard again on August 23, 1990, with due and regular
notice of the time, place and purpose of the hearing having been
given to all interested parties as required by law and the rules
of the Board.
2.

The Board has jurisdiction over the subject matter,

of the Request for Agency Action and over all parties interested
therein and has jurisdiction to make and promulgate the order
hereinafter set forth.
3.

The Request for Agency Action in this matter is a

request to modify the order in Cause No. 139-13, specifying the
percentage of costs to be recovered by all consenting owners of
the Miles 2-1B5 well, Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5 West,
USM, Duchesne County, Utah, (hereinafter "Miles 2-1B5 well").
The order in Cause No. 139-13 dated April 30, 1981, and effective
July 26, 1979, force pooled the drilling unit created by the
order of this Board in Cause No. 139-3.
Specifically the Request for Agency Action sought
relief as follows:
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(a)

That the consenting owners of the the Miles 2-1B5

well be reimbursed for.S.H. Bennion's share, a non-consenting
mineral interest owner, of the costs out of production from the
unit attributable to S.H. Bennion's interests;
(b)

That the consenting owners of the Miles 2-1B5 well

own and be entitled to receive all production from the Miles 21B5 well applicable to each tract or interest and obligations
payable out of production until the consenting owners have been
paid the amount due under the terms of the modified order
relating to the subject drilling unit;
(c)

That each consenting owner of the Miles 2-1B5 well

be entitled to receive, subject to royalty or similar
obligations, the share of the Miles 2-1B5 well applicable to its
interest in the separate drilling units and unless the consenting
owners agreed otherwise, its proportionate part of S.H. Bennion's
share of such production until costs are recovered;
(d)

That Bennion be entitled to receive, subject to

royalty or similar obligations, the share of the production from
the Miles 2-1B5 well applicable to S.H. Bennion's interest in the
subject drilling unit after the consenting interest owners
recover from S.H. Bennion's share of production the following:
(i)

100% of the non-consenting owner's share

of the costs of service equipment beyond the wellhead
connections, plus 100% ofjtfie

non-consenting owner's
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share of the cost of operation of the well commencing
with the first production and continuing until the
consenting owners have recovered these costs; and
(ii)

200% of that portion of the costs and

expenses of staking the location, well-site
preparation, rights of way, rigging up, drilling,
reworking, deepening, or plugging back, testing,
completing, and the cost of equipment in the well,
after deducting any cash contributions received by
the consenting owner;
(iii)

Interest charged in the amount of the

prime lending rate as periodically determined by
Citibank of New York, N.A., plus two percentage points.
(e)

That S.H. Bennion's ownership result in S.H.

Bennion receiving as a royalty, the average landowner's royalty
attributable to each tract within the subject drilling unit,
determined prior to the commencement of drilling, and payable
from the production allocated to each tract until the consenting
owners recovered the cost described in paragraphs (d), (i), (ii)/
and (iii) set forth above.
4.

The Board's previously entered order in Cause No.

139-13 force pooled all interests in the subject drilling unit,
finding, inter alia, that S.H. Bennion was the record owner of an
unleased, undivided, one-fourth mineral interest in all oil, gas
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and minerals located in the northeast quarter, southwest quarter,
and northwest quarter, southeast quarter, of Section 1, Township
2 South, Range 5 West, Uinta Special Meridian, Duchesne County,
Utah.

Further, the order held that Shell Oil Company, the

majority working interest owner and the sole operator of the
subject drilling unit, was willing to allow S.H. Bennion to share
in the proceeds of production of that unit from first production
in the Tew No. 1-1B5 well (hereinafter "Tew 1-1B5") as the
designated production well capable of producing oil and gas in
commercial quantities in the subject drilling unit.

The order

made no findings concerning the sharing of costs between
consenting and non-consenting owners.
5.

This original forced pooling order and S.H.

Bennion's interest in the pooling unit as set forth in the Cause
No. 139-13 was determined prior to amendments to the forced
pooling statute in 1977.
6.

Section 40-6-6 (6), Utah Code Ann.

On August 1, 1986, Petitioner ANR succeeded to the

interest of Shell .Oil Company in the subject drilling unit and
took over operation of the Tew 1-1B5 effective December 1, 1986.
7.

Effective July 1983, the Utah Legislature repealed

the then existing Oil and Gas Conservation Act and enacted a new
statute.

On April 12, 1985, this Board as enpowered by the 1983

Legislature entered its order in Cause No. 139-42 authorizing the
drilling and simultaneous production,of two wells from each

-7-

185

drilling unit in the Greater Altamont-Bluebell-Cedar Rim-Sink
Area in which Section 1 the subject drilling unit and wells are
located.
8.

On February 6, 1990, ANR commenced the Miles 2-1B5

well in Section 1 as the increased density second well in
Section 1.
9.

On May 24, 1990, arguments of the parties in this

cause and matter were heard and ANR put on evidence regarding the
cost of drilling to date, the estimated costs of drilling to
completion and the basis for its requests for a 200% non-consent
penalty.

S.H. Bennion put on no evidence in rebuttal.
10o

On June 21, 1990, the Board submitted questions to

the parties for further briefing.
11«

The Board in reviewing its order in Cause No.

139-13 determines that there has been a substantial change in
circumstances since the entry of that order.

The Board finds

that the change in statutory authority authorizing the drilling
and simultaneous production of more than one well in the subject
drilling unit, the geological and economic evidence supporting
its order in Cause No. 139-42 and the subsequent February 6, 1990
commencement of the Miles 2-1B5 well as an increased density well
in the subject drilling unit, constitute changes in circumstances
sufficient to support modification of its order in Cause No.
139-13.
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12.

Additionally, the Board in reviewing its order in

Cause No. 139-13 determines that the order is silent as to the
rights of consenting and non-consenting interest owners under the
pooling order concerning reimbursement for costs out of
production and share of production. The Board therefore finds
that regulation of operations in this forced pooling unit must be
modified and supplemented upon terms that are just and
reasonable.
13.

The Board finds that the Oil and Gas Conservation

Act of 1983, 1983 Utah Laws Chapter 205 provides the applicable
statutory grounds on which to base its modified order-

The Board

finds that all critical facts before the Board concerning this
Request for Agency Action occurred after the 1983 legislation was
enacted.

The Board finds the following facts to be critical:
(a) Increased density production wells were first

specifically authorized by the Utah Legislature in the 1983 Act.
(See Utah Code Ann. Section 40-6-6(4) (Supp. 1990).)

This

Board's order dated April 12, 1985, in Cause No. 139-63
authorized the drilling of second wells for simultaneous
production because it found that one well per drilling unit was
not adequately draining the pool;
(b)

The Miles 2-1B5 well was drilled as a second well

under the Board's increased density order after 1983; and

1 «7

(c)

Prior to the above-stated events, this Board's

order in Cause No. 139-13 would not have required modification
because no additional wells could have been drilled.
14.

S.H. Bennion has not entered into any prior

agreement with consenting interest owners which supplants the
statutory authority and duty of this board to impose costs as
provided under § 40-6-6(6), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
15.

That within the range of 150% to 200% of the

mandatory non-consent penalty provided under § 40-6-6(6)(b), Utah
Code Ann. (1953/ as amended), there is sufficient evidence of
risk incurred by the consenting owner that a penalty of 175% is
appropriate.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

All interests in the subject drilling unit were

force pooled by order of this Board as of July 26, 1979.
2.

The Board has the necessary and inherent authority,

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-1 and 40-6-6, (1953 as
amended) to amend, modify or supplement its previous pooling
orders where there has been a substantial change in circumstances
or an omission in a prior order and where failure to modify the
order would result in the continued enforcement of terms which
are not just and reasonable or which would fail to protect
correlative rights.

4.

The relief ordered by the Board in this matter will

prevent the drilling of unnecessary wells, prevent waste, and
protect correlative rights.
Sufficient evidence now being available upon which to
reach a decision, the Board issues the following:
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

The order previously entered in Cause No. 139-13 is

amended to provide that the consenting owners of the Miles 2-1B5
well shall be reimbursed from S.H. Bennion's share of costs out
of the production from the unit attributable to S.H. Bennion's
interests.
2.

Consenting owners from the subject unit shall own

and be entitled to receive all production from the Miles 2-1B5
well applicable to each tract or interest and obligations payable
out of production until the consenting owners have been paid the
amount due under the terms of this order relating to the subject
drilling unit.
3.

Each consenting interest owner in the unit will be

entitled to receive, subject to royalty or other similar
obligations, his or her share of production of the Miles 2-1B5
well applicable to their interest in the drilling unit and, its
proportionate part of S.H. Bennion's share or such production
until costs are recovered.
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4.

S.H. Bennion shall be entitled to receive, subject

to royalty or similar obligations, his share of production from
the Miles 2-1B5 well applicable to his interest in the subject
drilling unit after the consenting owners have recovered from
S.H. Bennion's share of production the following:
(a) 100% of S.H. Bennion's share as nonconsenting owner of the cost of surface
equipment beyond the well head connections plus
100% of the non-consenting owners share of the costs
of operation of the well commencing with the first
production and continuing until the consenting owners
have retrieved these costs;
(b) 175% of that portion of the costs and
expenses of staking the location, well-side
preparation, rights of way, rigging up, drilling, reworking, deepening, or plugging back, testing, completing, and the cost of equipment in the well after
deducting any cash contributions received by the
consenting owners; and
(c)

Interest on these amounts is to be

assessed at the amount of the prime lending rate as
periodically determined by Citibank of New York, NA,
plus two percentage points,
(d)

S.H. Bennion's interest not currently

being subject to lease or other contract development
-12-

of oil and gas, S.H. Bennion is entitled to receive
as royalty, the average landowner's royalty
attributable to each tract within the subject
drilling unit, effective as of the date prior to the
commencement of the drilling of the well on the subject
drilling unit.
5.

To the extent that any previous order of the Board

is inconsistent with this order, those orders are hereby vacated
to the extent of such inconsistency.
6.

The Board retains exclusive and continuing

jurisdiction over all matters covered by this order and over all
the parties affected thereby and particularly reserves exclusive
and continuing jurisdiction to make further orders as appropriate
and as authorized by statute and regulation.

DATED this P y O

day of

S^€^4-gj^ L & W

, 1990.

STATE OF UTAH
OARD OF OIL, GAS^AND MINING

JAMES W. CARTER
ACTING CHAIRMAN

Exhibit B to Addendum

BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING,
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
2N AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE HATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF S. H. BENHION FOR AN ORDER
POOLING INTEREST IN THE DRILLING
UNIT COMPRISED OF SECTION 1,
TOKNSHIP 2 SOUTH OF RANGE 5 VEST,
UIKTAE SPECIAL MERIDIAN, DUCHESNE
COUNTY, UTAH

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER
Cause No. 139-13

)

This cause cane on for hearing before the Board of
Oil, Gas and Mining, Department of Natural Resources, the State
of Utah, at 10:00 a.m., on Thursday, July 26, 1979, in the
Executive Conference Room, Boliday 2nn, 1659 Nest North Temple,
Salt Lake City, Utah, pursuant to the Amended Application of
S. H. Bennion (•Bennion-) and to notice to all interested parties duly and regularly given by the Board, to consider forced
pooling of the uncommitted interest of Bennion in the abovecaptioned'drilling unit, and other matters ae set forth in the
Amended Application -and Notice -of Hearing.
The following members of the Board were present:
Charles R. Henderson, Chairman
Edward T. Beck
C. Ray Juvelin
E. Steele Melntyre
John L. Bell
Also present and representing the Division:
I

Cleon B. reight, Director

A

Thalia R. Busby, Administrative Assistant

i

Frank M. Bamner, Chief Petroleum Engineer

•vtn mm »«t &*rr m n

M m

Michael, Minder, Geological Engineer
Denise A. Dragoo, Special Assistant Attorney General
Appearances were made as follows:
S. H. Bennion, for himself
Peter Stirba, Counsel for S. B. Bennion
Don Gallion, Counsel for Shell Oil Company
Gregory P. Killiams, Counsel for Shell Oil Company
This cause also came on for hearing before the Board
of Oil, Gas and Mining, Department of Katural Resources, State
of Utah, on October 24, 1979, at the Wildlife Kesources Auditorium,* 1596 West North Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah.
The following Board members were present:
Charlea R. Benderson, Chairman
John L. Bell
C. Bay Juvelin
E. Steele Mclntyre
Constance K. Lundberg
Edward T. Beck
Also present and representing the Division:
Cleon B. Feight, Director
Thalia R. Busby, Administrative Assistant
Frank M. Bamner, Chief Petroleum Engineer
Michael Minder, Geological Engineer
Denise A. Dragoo, Special Assistant Attorney General
Appearances were made as follows:
S. B. Bennion, for himself
Peter Stirba, Counsel for S. B. Bennion
Don Gallion, Counsel for Shell Oil Company
Gregory P. Killiams, Counsel for Shell Oil Company
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This cause also came on for bearing before the Board
of Oil, Gas and Mining, Department of Natural Kesourees, State
of Dtah, on December 18, 1980, at the Kildlife Kesourees Auditorium, 1596 Vest North Temple, Salt take City, Utah.
The following Board members were presents
John L. Bell, Co-Chairman
Charles Benderson
Thadis W. Box
E. Steele Melntyre
C. Kay Juvelin
Also present and representing the Division:
Cleon B. Feight, Director
Bon Daniels, Coordinator
Mike Minder, Petroleum Engineer
Paula Frank, Secretary
Denise A. Dragoo, Special Assistant Attorney General
Appearances were made as follows:
Peter Stirba, Counsel for S. B. Bennion
Lowell *irkpatrick, for Shell Oil Company
Gregory P. Williams, Counsel for Shell Oil Company
NOW, THERFORE, the Board, having considered the
matters presented at said hearings and the remarks and the
stipulations of counsel, now makes and enters the following:

FINDINGS
1. That due and regular notice of the time, place*
and purpose of said hearings was given to all interested parties in the form and manner and within the time required by law.
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2. That the Board has jurisdiction over the matters
covered by the Amended Application and all of the parties
interested therein, and has jurisdiction to make and promulgate
the Order hereinafter set forth.
3. That Bennlon Is the record owner of an unleased,
undivided one-fourth mineral interest in all oil, gas and minerals located in the HEfc SWfc and KWk Sth of Section 1, Township
2 South, Range 5 Vest, Uintah Special Meridian, Duchesne
County, Utah.
4. That by Order in Cause Ho. 139-3, entered June 24,
1971, as amended by Order in Cause No. 139-8, entered September
20, 1972, the Board established said Section 1, Township 2
South, Range 5 Kest, Unitah Speeial Meridian, as a drilling and
spacing unit for the production of oil, gas, and associated
hydrocarbons from the spaced interval described in said orders;
that Shell Oil Company has drilled the TEW 1-1B5 veil in said
Section 1 which is producing from said interval and is the permitted veil for said drilling unit.
5. That said Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5
Kest, Uintah Special Meridian, contains €78*2 acres? and that
Bennlon's interest in said drilling and spacing unit is a
2.94898% interest.
S. That Shell is the major working interest owner and
is the sole operator within said drilling unit? and that Shell
is willing to let Bennlon share in the proceeds of production
of said unit from first production.
7. That pursuant to the Board9s Interim Order in this
cause dated March 26, 1980, all Interests in the drilling unit
comprised of Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5 Kest, Uintah
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Special Meridian, in the Altamont Field of Duchesne County,
Utah, were pooled for the development and operation of said
drilling unit and for the protection of correlative rights,
effective at 6t00 a.m., Mountain Daylight time, July 26, 1979.
8, That Bennion's proportionate share of the net revenue from the production of the subject well up to 6:00 a.m..
Mountain Daylight tine on July 26, 1979, is $72,222.41 which
consists of the following!
Working Interest Accumulations
Revenue
Oil

1101,608.86

Gas

3,482.23

Total

105,091.09

Expenditures

47,203.16

NET

$57,887.93

Royalty Interest Accumulations*
Oil

$13,872.44

Cas

462.04

Total

$14,334.48

Total Accumulations
Working Interest

$57,887.93

loyalty Interest

14.334.48

Total

$72,222.41

('Based on a one-eighth cost free royalty, proportionately re*
duced, until payout*

Upon payout this royalty verges with and

is included in the working interest.)
9.

That pursuant to the Board's Interim Order in this

cause dated March 26, 1980, Shell paid the Division of Oil, Gas,
and Mining the sun of $72,222.41 which sum was placed in a
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six-month money market certificate as directed by counsel for
Bennion and Shell* that the original certificate earned interest in the amount of $3,917•C9i and that the original sum and
interest were invested in a new certificate which bears interest at the rate of 13.519% and will mature on May 6, 1981.
10. That Bennion has conducted an audit of Shell's
records relating to the subject well at Shell's offices in
Houston, Texas, and has submitted a report relating to such
audit to the Board.
11. That it is the practice of the Industry to conduct an audit of an operator's records at the office where the
operator maintains such records? and that there are standard
accounting procedures in the industry relating to such audits.

ORDER
IT ZS THEREFORE ORDERED BY TEE BOARD:
1. That all interests in the drilling unit comprised
of Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5 West, Dintah Special
Meridian, in the Xltamont Field of Duchesne County, Dtah, .be and
the same are pooled for the development and operation of said
drilling unit and for the protection of correlative rights,
effective at 6*00 a.m., Mountain Daylight time, July 26, 1979.
2. That the TEW 1-1B5 well located in said Section 1
is the permitted well for said drilling unit.
3* That Bennion is entitled to receive from Shell
Bennion's proportionate share of production of oil, gas liquids, and natural gas in-kind produced from the subject well
from and after €:00 a.m., Mountain Daylight time, July 26, 1979,
upon payment of Bennion's proportionate share of the monthly
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operating expense of said veil; that Shall will tender fiennion
invoices for his proportionate share of the monthly operating
expense in the same manner and in the same detail as if Bennion
had signed the Operating Agreement in effect for aaid unit;
that in the event Bennion fails to pay his proportionate share
of the monthly operating expense within IS days of invoice.
Shell shall have a first and preferred lien on Bennion*s interest in production and shall be entitled to withhold the amount
of said production in an amount equal to Bennion1 s share of the
operating expense plus interest at the prevailing rate until
such payment is received; and that should such default continue
for a period of ninety (90) days after receipt of invoice, Shell
shall be entitled to retain Bennion's proportionate ahare of
production to the extent of Shell9a lien or to tender the production withheld pursuant to Shell's lien to Bennion and pursue
other available legal remedies.
4. That Bennion's interest in said drilling unit is a
2.948981 interest.
5. That Bennion is not entitled to share in production
occurring prior to 6:00 a.m., Mountain Daylight time on July 26,
1979, in-kind but is entitled to share in the proceeds of such
production; that the amount to which Bennion is entitled with
respect to production occurring prior to 6:00 a.m.. Mountain
Daylight time on July 26, 1979, ia $72,222.41; and that the Board
shall transfer ownership of the money market certificate purchased
pursuant to the Interim Order dated March 26, 1980, to Bennion. Zn
addition. Shell shall pay Bennion the sum of $2,504.00, representing interest at 6 percent ptz

annum on Bennion'a statutory royalty

interest for the period from first production until the purchase
of the original money market certificate.
6.

That any further audit of Shell's records relating

to the subject drilling unit which Bennion wishes to conduct
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shall be performed at Bennionfs expense at the location at which
such records are kept; and that any such audit shall be con*
ducted pursuant to the accounting procedures of the industry.
DATED this 3?"

day of $}*»*£.
, 1981.
V
STATE OF UTAH
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING

r:i*f:d£'.

Charges R. Henderson, Chairman

ESffi^

rd T. Becif J

John I. Bell
/

Thadis W. Box

WMWwr,
E. Steele ttclntyre
Rober\ R. Norman \

Margaret Bird
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Exhibit C to Addendum

BEFORE TEE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING
DEPARTMENT OF KATDRAL RESOURCES
STATE OF UTAH

IN TEE TATTER OF THE AMENDED
PETITION OF ANR LIMITED INC.,
ET AL. FOR AN ORDER MODIFYING
PREVIOUS ORDERS WHICH
ESTABLISHED DRILLING AND
SPACING UNITS AND ANY OTHER
ORDERS RELATING TO TEST WELLS
FOR -THE "ALTAMONT, BLUEBELL
AND '.CEDAR -RIM-SINK DRAW
FIELDS, DUCHESNE .AND UINTAH'
COUNTIES, UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER
Docket No. 85-DC7
Cause No. 139-42

Pursuant t o the Amended N o t i c e of Bearing dated March
4 , 1S85 of t h e Board of O i l , Gas and Mining ("Board"), Department
of Natural Resources of t h e S t a t e of Utah, s a i d cause came on for
hearing on Thursday, April 1 1 , 1985 at 10:00 a.m. i n t h e Beard
Room of the D i v i s i o n of O i l , Gas and Mining ( " D i v i s i o n " ) , 355
West North Temple, 3 Triad Center, S u i t e 3 0 1 , S a l t Lake C i t y ,
Utah.
The f o l l o w i n g

members of t h e Board v e r e p r e s e n t :

Gregory P. W i l l i a m s , Chairman
James W. Carter
Charles R. Eenderson
Richard B. Larson
E. S t e e l e Kclntyre
John K. Garr, having recused h i m s e l f ,
did not p a r t i c i p a t e

Mark C. Koench, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, was present
on behalf of the Board.
Members of t h e Staff of t h e Division p r e s e n t and
p a r t i c i p a t i n g in the hearing included:
Dr. Dianne R. Nielson, Director
Ronald J . F i r t h , Associate Director
John R. Baza, Petroleum Engineer
Barbara W. Roberts, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, was
present on behalf of the D i v i s i o n .
Appearances were made as f o l l o w s :
Limited, £l £!•$

P e t i t i o n e r s AMR

by Frank Douglass, Esq. and Ray H. Langenberg,

Austin, Texas; Robert G. P r u i t t , J r . , Esq., S a l t Lake City, Utah;
Frank J . Gustin, Esq., S a l t Lake City, Utah; Louis A. Posekany,
J r . , General Counsel, and George W.

Eellstrom, Esq., ANR

Production Company; P h i l l i p K. C h a t t i n , General Counsel, Otex Oil
Company; Hugh C. Garner, Esq., for Coastal Oil & Gas Corporation;
P h i l l i p William Lear # Esq., for P h i l l i p s Petroleum Company;
Jeffrey R. Young, Esq., for Bow Valley Petroleum, I n c . ; B. J .
L e v i s , Esq., Vice P r e s i d e n t , and Robert W. Adkins, E s q . , Linxaar
Energy Corporation; Robert B u e t t n e r , Esq. f Koch Exploration
Company; Lane Jamison, Esq., Sonat E x p l o r a t i o n Company; Victor
Brown and Robert Brown, Utah Royalty A s s o c i a t i o n ; John Harja,
E s q . , Gulf Oil Corporation; Martin Seneca, General Counsel, Dte
Indian T r i b e ; Assad M. Raffoul, Petroleum Engineer, Bureau of
Land Management; John Chasel, on h i s own behalf; George Morris,
Esq.r Ute D i s t r i b u t i o n Corporation; Dr. Gilbert Miller,
Conservation Superintendent, Amarada Bess Corporation; end L*. A.
P i k e , Roosevelt, Utah, landowner.
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Now therefore, the Board having considered the
testimony of the witnesses, John C. Osmond, Petroleum Geologist;
Clarke Gillespie, Petroleum Reservoir Engineer; and R. Thayne
Robson, Economist, for Petitioners and B. J. Lewis, Vice
President, and John W. Clark, Petroleum Engineer, for Linmar
Energy Corporation, and the exhibits received at said hearing and
being fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the
following:
FTWPTMfiS OP PACT

1.

Due and regular notice of the time, place and

purpose of the hearing was given t o a l l interested parties as
recuirec by law and the rules and regulations of the Board.
2.

The Board has j u r i s d i c t i o n over the matters covered

by said notice and over a l l p a r t i e s interested therein and has
j u r i s d i c t i o n to make and promulgate any order hereinafter set
forth.
3.

The Board has heretofore entered 640 acre drilling

and spacing orders for the Lower Green River/Wasatch Formation in'
Causes No. 139-3, 139-4, 139-5, 139-8, and 1.39-17 (Altaaont
F i e l d ) , Causes No. 131-11, 131-14, 131-24, 131-27, 131-32, 13133, 131-34, 131-45 and 131-55, (Bluebell F i e l d ) , and Causes No.
140-6 and 140-7 (Cedar Rim-Sink Draw Field) as t o the following
described l a n d s :
DINT AH SPECIAL MERIDIAN
Township 1 Northr fiarqp 1 WfBt
Sections: 19-36
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Township 1 Worth. Sana* 9 W P ^

Sections:

19-36

Township 1 N o r t h . P s n g e 3 West

Sections 23-26, 35 and 36
Township 1 S o u t h . Panne 1 E a s t

Sections:

All (except Roosevelt Unit)

Township 1 South'. Panoe 9 E a s t

Sections:

4-8,18-19, 30-31

Township 1 S o u t h . Range 1 West

Sections:

All (except Roosevelt Unit)

Township 1 S o u t h . Panoe 1 t h r o u g h 4 West

Sections:

All

Township 1 S o u t h . Pence 5 West

Sections:

10-17, 20-36

Township 1 S o u t h . P a n e * fi West

Sections:

25-26, 35-36

Township ? S o u t h . Panqe 1 t h r o u g h 9 P a s t

Sections:

All

Township 7 S o u t h . Ranoe 1 t h r o u g h 6 West

Sections:

All

Township 7 S o u t h . Panoe 7 West

Sections:

19, 30-36

Township 9 S o u t h . Panoe ft West

Sections:

23-26, 31-36

Township 3 S o u t h . Ranee 3 West

Sections:

5-8, 17-20, 29-32

Township 3 S o u t h . Panqe 4 t h r o u g h ft West

Sections:- All
Township 4 S o u t h . Panqe 3 West

Sections:

5 and 6

Township 4 S o u t h . Panqe 4 West

Sections:

1-6

Township 4 S o u t h . Panqe 5 West

Sections:

1-6
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TnwnsMo A South. Paneo 6 Most
Sections:
1-18
SALT LAKE MERIDIAN
TownsMp 5 South. 'RanOP 19 E a s t
Sections:
2 0 - 2 3 , 26-29,
32-35
Township 6 S o u t h . Range 19

Sections:
and 34
4.

Fast

3 - 5 , 9 , 1 0 , 1 5 , 16, 22, 27

In Cause No. 140-12, the Board authorized the

d r i l l i n g of t e s t or second v e i l s that may only be produced
alternatively vith the i n i t i a l v e i l on the same d r i l l i n g unit.
5.

The Lower Green River/Wasatch Formation underlying

tne subject f i e l d s constitutes a pool as that term i s defined in
Utah Code Ann. §40-6-2(9) (1953, as amended), and i s a highly
complex s e r i e s of isolated and discontinuous beds of productive
rock that are randomly distributed v e r t i c a l l y over a several
thousand f e e t thick interval.

Normally, the productive beds are

separate and d i s t i n c t and not in communication with each other.
6.

Many of the productive beds are not correlatable

from v e i l t o v e i l and v i l l not afford communication betveen v e i l s
AS close as 1000 f e e t .

Of the productive beds that correlate,

various geological factors prevent a s i g n i f i c a n t number form
communicating betveen v e i l s within the same s e c t i o n .
7.

Geologic and engineering information from i n i t i a l

unit v e i l s and t e s t v e i l s shov that a s i n g l e well v i l l not
e f f e c t i v e l y drain the recoverable o i l and gas underlying any
given 640 acre spacing unit because the productive beds are too
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small or have other limiting c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s precluding effective
and e f f i c i e n t drainage of the recoverable reserves underlying the
unit.
8.

Data from production logs and f i e l d performance

show that t e s t v e i l s drilled under the Order in Cause No* 140-12
after 1978 have caused the.recovery of substantial amounts of o i l
from separate and d i s t i n c t productive beds and from previously
uncepleted productive beds, and that the d r i l l i n g of additional
v e i l s on e x i s t i n g units v i l l increase the ultimate recovery of
o i l from the subject f i e l d s .
9.

The prohibition of simultaneous production from the

i n i t i a l v e i l and t e s t v e i l on the same unit has caused the
shutting in of v e i l s v i t h the potential to produce substantial
amounts of additional reserves.
10.

Each additional v e i l d r i l l e d under t h i s order v i l l

tap producing formations that are separate and d i s t i n c t from and
not in communication vith any other producing formation and i s
not an unnecessary v e i l .
11.

In some areas of the subject f i e l d s , geologic,

engineering, and economic factors j u s t i f y d r i l l i n g additional
v e i l s on e x i s t i n g u n i t s .

In other areas, geologic, engineering

and economic factors*may not j u s t i f y d r i l l i n g additional v e i l s on
existing units.
rnrcrT.PSTONS OP t w
1.

Due and regular notice of the time, place and
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purpose of the hearing vas given to all interested parties as
required by law and the rules and regulations of the Board.
2.

The Board has jurisdiction over the natters covered

by said notice and over all parties interested therein and has
jurisdiction to make and promulgate any order hereinafter set
forth.
3.

The Board is authorized to modify its previous

orders to permit additional veils to be drilled vithin
established units under Utah Code Ann. $40-6-6(4) (1953, as
amended).
4.

An order permitting (a) the drilling of additional

veils on existing units as provided herein and (b) the
simultaneous production of initial veils and additional veils
vill prevent the vaste of hydrocarbons, prevent the drilling of
unnecessary wells, and protect correlative rights.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
To prevent vaste of oil, gas and associated liquid
hydrocarbons, to avoid the drilling of unnecessary veils, to
protect correlative rights and to maintain, to the maximum extent
practicable, drilling units of uniform size and shape for the
promotion of more orderly development of the lands described in
Finding of Fact No. 3 above, the following order is hereby
promulgated to govern operations in said area effective as of
April 12, 1985":

A.

Upon the effective date any and all orders of the

Board heretofore promulgated which are inconsistent with the
orders herein set forth shall be and are hereby vacated to the
extent inconsistent herewith.
B.

Additional wells may be drilled, completed, and

produced on established drilling units comprising government
surveyed sections of approximately 640 acres (or other designated
drilling units so long as such unit is at least 400 acres in
size) to a density of no greater than two producing wells on each
unit comprising a section (or other designated unit)•
C.

Additional wells may be drilled at the option of

the operator of the unit, based upon geologic and engineering
data for that unit which will justify the drilling of an
additional well in order to recover additional oil, provided the
additional well appears to be economically feasible.
D.

Economically feasible means that a prudent operator

would have a reasonable opportunity to recover the costs of
drilling, completing, producing and operating the well, plus a
reasonable profit.
£.

Jt Is not the intent of .this jDrder, .in permitting

additional wells to be drilled on established drilling units, to
change or amend the existing contractual rights or relationships,
express or implied, of any parties who share in production or the
proceeds therefrom in the spaced area.
F.

Any additional veil must be located at least 1,320

feet from the existing well on'the unit and not closer than 660

8-

feet from the exterior boundary of the unit.

Ko tvo v e i l s may be

drilled in any drilling unit vithin the same governmental quarter
section or equivalent l o t .
G.

If an operator e l e c t s t o i n i t i a l l y complete a veil

solely vithin producing formations that are separate and distinct
from and not in communication vith any other producing formation,
the operator v i l l use reasonable precautions in order that such
v e i l i s not completed in any producing formation that may be
effectively drained by any other v e i l .
E. . Second or test v e i l s drilled under previous orders
as v e i l as additional v e i l s to be drilled under this order may be
produced simultaneously vith i n i t i a l v e i l s .
I.

The Board retains exclusive and continuing

jurisdiction of a l l matters covered by t h i s order and of all
parties affected thereby and particularly that the Board retains
and reserves

exclusive and continuing jurisdiction to make

further orders as appropriate and authorized by statute and
applicable regulations.
ENTERED this_Z2zrday x>f

A v r, f

. 1985.

STATE OF UTAH
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MIKING

SRSFTTWZ LLIAMSf Chairman

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

MARK C MOENCH •
Assistant Attorney General
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Exhibit D to Addendum

40-6-6. Drilling units — Establishment — Pooling of interests — Order — Operation.
(1) The Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, may order the establishment of
drilling units covering any pool. All such orders shall be made upon terms and
conditions that are just and reasonable. Drilling units shall be of uniform size
and shape for the entire pool unless the board finds that it must make an
exception due to geologic or geographic or other factors. When necessary the
board may divide any pool into zones and establish drilling units for each
zone, which units may differ in size and shapefromthose established in any
other zone. The order shall include:
(a) the acreage to be embraced within each drilling unit and the shape
of each drilling unit as determined by the board but the unit shall not be
smaller than the maximum area that can be efficiently and economically
drained by one well; and
(b) the direction that no more than one well shall be drilled for production from the common source of supply on any drilling unit, and the
authorized location of the well.
(2) The board may modify the order to provide an exception to the authorized location of the well when the board finds such a modification to be
reasonably necessary.
(3) An order establishing drilling units for a pool shall cover all lands
determined by the board to be underlaid by the pool, and the order may be
modified by the board to include additional areas determined to be underlaid
by the pool.
(4) After an order fixing drilling units has been entered by the board, the
drilling of any well into the pool at a location other than authorized by the
order, is prohibited. The operation of any well drilled in violation of an order
fixing drilling units is prohibited. The board may modify the order to decrease
or increase the size of the drilling units or permit additional wells to be drilled
within the established units.
(5) Two or more owners within a drilling unit may pool their interests for
the development and operation of the unit. In the absence of voluntary pooling, the board may enter an order pooling all interests in the drilling unit for
the development and operation. The order shall be made upon terms and
conditions that are just and reasonable. Operations incident to the drilling of
a well upon any portion of a unit covered by a pooling order shall be deemed
for all purposes to be the conduct of the operations upon each separately
owned tract in the unit by the several owners. That portion of the production
allocated or applicable to each tract included in a unit covered by a pooling

order shall, when produced, be deemed for all purposes to have been produced
from each tract by a well drilled thereon.
(6) Each pooling order shall permit the drilling and operation of a well on
the drilling unit by any owner within the drilling unit, and shall provide for
the payment of the costs, including a reasonable charge for supervision and
storage facilities, as provided in this subsection.
In relation to each owner who refuses to agree to bear his proportionate
share of the costs of the drilling and operation of the well (the nonconsenting
owner), the order shall provide for reimbursement to the owner paying for the
drilling and operation of the well (consenting owners) for the nonconsenting
owner's share of the costs out of, and only out of, production from the unit
attributable to his tract. The board is authorized to provide that the consenting owners shall own and be entitled to receive all productionfromthe well,
applicable to each tract or interest, and obligations payable out of production,
until the consenting owners have been paid the amount due under the terms
of the pooling order or order relating to the drilling unit. In the event of any •
dispute as to such costs, the board shall determine the proper costs. The order
shall provide that each consenting owner shall be entitled to receive, subject
to royalty or similar obligations, the share of the production of the well applicable to his interest in the unit, and, unless he has agreed otherwise, his
proportionate part of the nonconsenting owner's share of such production until
costs are recovered as provided in this subsection; and that each nonconsenting owner shall be entitled to receive, subject to royalty or similar obligations,
the share of production from the well applicable to his interest in the unit
after the consenting owners have recovered from the nonconsenting owner's *
share of production the following:
(a) In respect to every such well 100% of the nonconsenting owner's
share of the cost of surface equipment beyond the wellhead connections
(including, but not limited to, stock tanks, separators, treaters, pumping
equipment, and piping), plus 100% of the nonconsenting owner's share of
the cost of operation of the well commencing with first production and
continuing until the consenting owners have recovered these costs, it
being intended that the nonconsenting owner's share of these costs and
equipment will be that interest which would have been chargeable to the
nonconsenting owner had he initially agreed to pay his share of the costs
of the well from the beginning of the operation; and

(b) An amount to be determined by the board but not less than 150%
nor to exceed 200% of that portion of the costs and expenses of staking the
location, wellsite preparation,rights-of-way,rigging up, drilling, reworking, deepening or plugging back, testing, and completing, and the cost of
equipment in the well (to and including the wellhead connections), after
deducting any cash contributions received by the consenting owners. A
reasonable interest charge may be included if the board finds it appropriate.
(7) The order shall provide that:
(a) A nonconsenting owner of a tract in a drilling unit, which tract is
subject to a lease or other contract for the development of oil and gas,
shall have the costs provided in Subsection (6) paidfromthe production
attributable to that tract. Any royalty interest or other interest not liable
for the costs of production shall be paid by the nonconsenting owner and
not from the production attributable to the tract until the consenting
owners have recovered the costs as provided in Subsection (6).
(b) A nonconsenting owner of a tract in a drilling unit, which is not
subject to a lease or other contract for the development of oil and gas,
shall receive as a royalty the average landowners royalty attributable to
each tract within the drilling unit, determined prior to the commencement of drilling and payable from the production allocated to each tract
until the consenting owners have recovered the costs as provided in Subsection (6).
(8) The operator of a well under a pooling order in which there are nonconsenting owners shall furnish the nonconsenting owners with monthly statements of all costs incurred, together with the quantity of oil or gas produced,
and the amount of proceeds realized from the sale of this production during
the preceding month. If and when the consenting owners recoverfroma nonconsenting owner's relinquished interest the amounts provided for in Subsection (6) of this section, the relinquished interest of the nonconsenting owner
shall automatically revert to him; and the nonconsenting owner shall from
that time own the same interest in the well and the productionfromit, and be
liable for the further costs of the operation as if he had participated in the
initial drilling and operation. These costs are payable out of production unless
otherwise agreed between the nonconsenting owner and the operator.
History: C. 1953, 40-6-6, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 205, § 1.

